Implementability by a Canonical Indirect Mechanism of an Optimal Two-Dimensional Direct Mechanism

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dc.contributor.authorKojima, Naoki
dc.date.accessioned2018-07-09T08:07:49Z
dc.date.available2018-07-09T08:07:49Z
dc.date.issued2017-02
dc.description.abstractThe present paper investigates the multi-dimensional mechanism design in which buyers have taste and budget as their private information. The paper shows an easy proof of a two-dimensional optimal direct mechanism by a one-dimensional indirect mechanism: A canonical mechanism in the traditional one-dimensional setting, i.e., function of one variable, the buyer’s taste. It also sheds light on where the difficulty lies implementability of a general direct mechanism—not optimal—by a canonical mechanism.en_US
dc.identifier.citationTheoretical Economics Letters, 2017, 7, 187-192en_US
dc.identifier.issn2162-2086
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.4236/tel.2017.72016
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/1736
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherScientific Researchen_US
dc.subjectMulti-Dimensional Mechanismen_US
dc.subjectIndirect Mechanismen_US
dc.subjectBudget Constrainten_US
dc.subjectRevelation Principleen_US
dc.titleImplementability by a Canonical Indirect Mechanism of an Optimal Two-Dimensional Direct Mechanismen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
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