Are Background Feelings Intentional Feelings?

dc.contributor.authorBarile, Emilia
dc.date.accessioned2018-07-24T10:15:54Z
dc.date.available2018-07-24T10:15:54Z
dc.date.issued2014-11
dc.description.abstractI address the problem of the intentionality of “feeling”, considering the study-case of “background feelings” (malaise, tension, etc.) in Damasio (2003, 2010). Background feelings, in fact, are “border case” feelings: These feelings seem lacking intentionality, at least by the meaning that their intentional content is not any object in the world they refer to. Differently from other feelings connected to intentional states (such as emotions, for ex., feelings are mainly considered arising from), background feelings reveal a bodily nature of feeling at its core, while intentionality of feelings, when any, rather depends on the intentionality of the states feelings concern. Background feelings reveal an intimate, immediate relation to our own body we can’t catch considering feelings always and only connected to emotions. The intimate relation to the body, coming in “foreground” in these feelings only, should shed more light on another key feature of feelings, namely their phenomenality, more than their “supposed” intentionality.en_US
dc.identifier.citationOpen Journal of Philosophy, 2014, 4, 560-574en_US
dc.identifier.issn2163-9442
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojpp.2014.44058
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/2008
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherScientific Researchen_US
dc.subjectFeelingsen_US
dc.subjectEmotionen_US
dc.subjectIntentionalityen_US
dc.subjectBodily Selfen_US
dc.subjectDamasioen_US
dc.subjectPhenomenal Consciousnessen_US
dc.titleAre Background Feelings Intentional Feelings?en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
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