Are Background Feelings Intentional Feelings?
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Date
2014-11
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Scientific Research
Abstract
I address the problem of the intentionality of “feeling”, considering the study-case of “background
feelings” (malaise, tension, etc.) in Damasio (2003, 2010). Background feelings, in fact, are “border
case” feelings: These feelings seem lacking intentionality, at least by the meaning that their intentional
content is not any object in the world they refer to. Differently from other feelings connected
to intentional states (such as emotions, for ex., feelings are mainly considered arising from),
background feelings reveal a bodily nature of feeling at its core, while intentionality of feelings,
when any, rather depends on the intentionality of the states feelings concern. Background feelings
reveal an intimate, immediate relation to our own body we can’t catch considering feelings always
and only connected to emotions. The intimate relation to the body, coming in “foreground” in these
feelings only, should shed more light on another key feature of feelings, namely their phenomenality,
more than their “supposed” intentionality.
Description
Keywords
Feelings, Emotion, Intentionality, Bodily Self, Damasio, Phenomenal Consciousness
Citation
Open Journal of Philosophy, 2014, 4, 560-574