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dc.contributor.authorHyun, Kwangho
dc.date.accessioned2018-07-24T09:51:19Z
dc.date.available2018-07-24T09:51:19Z
dc.date.issued2014-05
dc.identifier.citationOpen Journal of Philosophy, 2014, 4, 91-95en_US
dc.identifier.issn2163-9442
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojpp.2014.42013
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/2002
dc.description.abstractIt is controversial whether the mind is physically reducible or not. If the mind is physically reducible, it must share properties with the physical world. To find out how the mind can be characterized, an “additive property” is used to describe the mind. The additive property is shown where many causes result in one effect. The additive property is shown in the biological domain when the senses process received input. It is also shown in the intellectual activities of daily life. In the physical world, there is no cause without an effect. The additive property of events is not satisfied in physical domain. If the mind is physically reducible, the additive property of the mind should not be satisfied. Because the additive property is shown in the mind, the mind cannot be physically reduced in terms of relationships of cause and effects.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherScientific Researchen_US
dc.subjectAdditive Propertyen_US
dc.subjectReducibilityen_US
dc.subjectCausalityen_US
dc.subjectNeuronen_US
dc.subjectMind Bodyen_US
dc.titleAdditive Property and the Physical Reducibility of the Minden_US
dc.typeArticleen_US


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