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    Implementability by a Canonical Indirect Mechanism of an Optimal Two-Dimensional Direct Mechanism

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    Date
    2017-02
    Author
    Kojima, Naoki
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    Abstract
    The present paper investigates the multi-dimensional mechanism design in which buyers have taste and budget as their private information. The paper shows an easy proof of a two-dimensional optimal direct mechanism by a one-dimensional indirect mechanism: A canonical mechanism in the traditional one-dimensional setting, i.e., function of one variable, the buyer’s taste. It also sheds light on where the difficulty lies implementability of a general direct mechanism—not optimal—by a canonical mechanism.
    URI
    https://doi.org/10.4236/tel.2017.72016
    http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/1736
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    • Business and Economics [102]

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