| dc.contributor.author |
Farhat, Daniel |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2018-07-09T07:19:53Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2018-07-09T07:19:53Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2016-12 |
|
| dc.identifier.citation |
Theoretical Economics Letters, 2016, 6, 1230-1243 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.issn |
2162-2086 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/tel.2016.66116 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/1730 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
This study explores the impact of government intervention on the evolution of cooperation
using a popular framework for understanding cooperative behavior (the
public goods game). Agents either contribute to the production of a shared public
good or free-ride on the efforts of others. This game traditionally results in mass
free-riding (a sub-optimal outcome), in which case a government can intercede by
levying taxes and providing the public good to increase welfare. Is this still the case
when looking at an evolutionary framework with natural selection? Theoretical results
suggest that the government “levels the playing field”, allowing cooperative and
uncooperative behavior to coexist longer than it ordinarily would, but it cannot
change the course of evolution. |
en_US |
| dc.language.iso |
en |
en_US |
| dc.publisher |
Scientific Research |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
Public Goods Game |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
Cooperative Behavior |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
Government Intervention |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
Evolution |
en_US |
| dc.title |
The Evolution of Pro-Social Behavior and the Role of the Government |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Article |
en_US |
