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dc.contributor.authorHernández, José A.
dc.contributor.authorGuerrero-Luchtenberg, César
dc.date.accessioned2018-07-09T06:46:37Z
dc.date.available2018-07-09T06:46:37Z
dc.date.issued2016-04
dc.identifier.citationTheoretical Economics Letters, 2016, 6, 214-227en_US
dc.identifier.issn2162-2086
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.4236/tel.2016.62024
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/1720
dc.description.abstractThis paper describes how social capital emerges, relates to economic performance and evolves in the long run. Using the concept of psychological equilibrium, two types of individuals are generated in the population regarding their willingness to cooperate. We propose an evolutionary (learning) process over those types driven by the total payoffs of the psychological game, and provide a complete description of its dynamics. Macro-perceptions, defined as the individual perception of how cooperative the society is as a whole, are key to explain convergence to the full social capital state in the long run.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherScientific Researchen_US
dc.subjectPsychological Equilibriumen_US
dc.subjectBelief-Dependent Behavioren_US
dc.subjectEvolutionary Gamesen_US
dc.subjectReplicator Dynamicsen_US
dc.subjectEconomic Developmenten_US
dc.titleSocial Capital, Perceptions and Economic Performanceen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US


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